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Showing 5 results for Rasti-Barzoki

Parinaz Esmaeili, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, Seyed Reza Hejazi,
Volume 27, Issue 1 (IJIEPR 2016)
Abstract

Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known approaches in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are exploited to study the effects of pricing and advertising decisions on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal decisions in each case for the supplier, the manufacturer and the retailer. Also, we compare the outcomes decisions among the mentioned games. The results show that, the Cooperative and the Nash games have the highest and lowest advertising expenditure, respectively. The price level in the Nash game is more than the Stackelberg game for all three levels, and the retailer price in the Stackelberg and Cooperative games are equal. The system has the highest profit in the Cooperative game. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.


Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, Ali Kourank Beheshti, Seyed Reza Hejazi,
Volume 27, Issue 2 (IJIEPR 2016)
Abstract

This paper addresses a production and outbound distribution scheduling problem in which a set of jobs have to be process on a single machine for delivery to customers or to other machines for further processing. We assume that there is a sufficient number of vehicles and the delivery costs is independent of batch size but it is dependent on each trip. In this paper, we present an Artificial Immune System (AIS) for this problem. The objective is to minimize the sum of the total weighted number of tardy jobs and the batch delivery costs. A batch setup time has to be added before processing the first job in each batch. Using computational test, we compare our method with an existing method for the mentioned problem in literature namely Simulated Annealing (SA). Computational tests show the significant improvement of AIS over the SA.


Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, Hamed Jafari, Seyed Reza Hejazi,
Volume 28, Issue 1 (IJIEPR 2017)
Abstract

In the current study, a dual-channel supply chain is considered containing one manufacturer and two retailers. It is assumed that the manufacturer and retailers have the same decision powers. A game-theoretic approach is developed to analyze pricing decisions under the centralized and decentralized scenarios. First, the Nash model is established to obtain the equilibrium decisions in the decentralized case. Then, the centralized model is developed to maximize the total profit of the whole system. Finally, the equilibrium decisions are discussed and some managerial insights are revealed. 


Parinaz Esmaeili, Seyed Reza Hejazi, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 28, Issue 2 (IJIEPR 2017)
Abstract

This paper considers the advertising, pricing, and service decisions simultaneously to coordinate the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by advertising, pricing and service decisions. In this paper, three well-known approaches to the game theory, including the Nash, the Stackelberg-retailer, and the cooperative game are exploited to study the effects of these policies on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal strategies in each case for the manufacturer and the retailer. Then, we will compare the outcomes of each strategy thus developed. The results show that, compared with the Nash game, the Stackelberg-retailer game yields higher profits for the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole system. The cooperative game yields the highest profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.


Ali Borumand, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 30, Issue 3 (IJIEPR 2019)
Abstract

In this paper, greening, pricing, and advertising policies in a supply chain will be examined with government intervention. The supply chain has two members. First, a manufacturer seeking to determine the wholesale price and the greening level and second, a retailer that has to determine the advertising cost and the retail price. The government is trying to encourage the manufacturer to green the production using subsidies. Using the game theory, at first, the demand function and the profit functions of both members are introduced, then in a dynamic game, their Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated. Sensitivity and parameter analysis are made to more illustration of the problem. We found the supply chain profit function behavior and results show that if the sensitivity of demand-price is less than a specific value, the manufacturer will not participate in greening policies.

 

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