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Showing 4 results for Game Theory.
Pricing and Competition in Green Supply Chains Under Government Intervention
Mojtaba Nowrouzifasih, Anwar Mahmoodi, Reza Maihami,
Volume 0, Issue 0 (10-2024)
Abstract
The demand for green products has increased in the past few years due to the heightened awareness of environmental issues and the increasing use of green products by consumers. Thus, choosing the best strategy for green product manufacturers is essential. At the same time, producers and retailers are likely to have their decisions influenced by government actions. In this study, we attempt to determine the product's price and greenness within two competitive supply chains. The study investigates the pricing of two substitutable and green products in which each supply chain produces a green product. Using Nash and Stackelberg Game models, we determine how supply chains and their members interact. A Nash model involves two competing supply chains with equal power, within each supply chain, however, there is a Stackelberg competition between the retailer and the manufacturer. The Stackelberg model assumes that one of the supply chains is the market leader. The results show that with increasing government intervention (government's adjustment factor and green level floor for subsidies), regardless of Nash or Stackelberg structures, the green level of the product will increase, and wholesale and retail prices will decrease. Additionally, the price changes in the retailer-Stackelberg structure are greater than those in the manufacturer-Stackelberg structure. Also, by bearing the greenness cost by the manufacturer or retailer, companies can positively impact their profits as well as the level of greenness in their products. When the manufacturer makes an investment in greenness, the retailer and consumer benefit from it, and ultimately become the main force behind the development of green products.
 

Pricing and Advertising Decisions in a Three-level Supply Chain with Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative Games
Parinaz Esmaeili, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki, Seyed Reza Hejazi,
Volume 27, Issue 1 (3-2016)
Abstract

Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known approaches in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are exploited to study the effects of pricing and advertising decisions on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal decisions in each case for the supplier, the manufacturer and the retailer. Also, we compare the outcomes decisions among the mentioned games. The results show that, the Cooperative and the Nash games have the highest and lowest advertising expenditure, respectively. The price level in the Nash game is more than the Stackelberg game for all three levels, and the retailer price in the Stackelberg and Cooperative games are equal. The system has the highest profit in the Cooperative game. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.


A game theoretical approach for pricing in a two-level supply chain considering advertising and servicing
Parinaz Esmaeili, Seyed Reza Hejazi, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 28, Issue 2 (6-2017)
Abstract

This paper considers the advertising, pricing, and service decisions simultaneously to coordinate the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced by advertising, pricing and service decisions. In this paper, three well-known approaches to the game theory, including the Nash, the Stackelberg-retailer, and the cooperative game are exploited to study the effects of these policies on the supply chain. Using these approaches, we identify optimal strategies in each case for the manufacturer and the retailer. Then, we will compare the outcomes of each strategy thus developed. The results show that, compared with the Nash game, the Stackelberg-retailer game yields higher profits for the retailer, the manufacturer, and the whole system. The cooperative game yields the highest profits. Finally, the Nash bargaining model will be presented and explored to investigate the possibilities for profit sharing.


A Game Theoretic Approach for Greening, Pricing, And Advertising Policies in A Green Supply Chain
Ali Borumand, Morteza Rasti-Barzoki,
Volume 30, Issue 3 (9-2019)
Abstract
In this paper, greening, pricing, and advertising policies in a supply chain will be examined with government intervention. The supply chain has two members. First, a manufacturer seeking to determine the wholesale price and the greening level and second, a retailer that has to determine the advertising cost and the retail price. The government is trying to encourage the manufacturer to green the production using subsidies. Using the game theory, at first, the demand function and the profit functions of both members are introduced, then in a dynamic game, their Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated. Sensitivity and parameter analysis are made to more illustration of the problem. We found the supply chain profit function behavior and results show that if the sensitivity of demand-price is less than a specific value, the manufacturer will not participate in greening policies.

 
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