1- Department of industrial engineering, Urmia university, Urmia
2- University of Tabriz, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Industrial Engineering Department , b.esmailnezhad@tabrizu.ac.ir
Abstract: (421 Views)
Environmental issues cause consumers to pay attention to green products. Therefore, companies are looking to manufacture green products to prevent market share loss through investing in new environmental technologies. This paper models a green supply chain (GSC) including a manufacturer and a retailer by game theory. The supply chain members could make a decision together or individually about green investment cost and the transparency of the product's greenness level. We consider two scenarios, including a centralized and a decentralized supply chain, to study the interaction between supply chain members. Also, we develop two scenarios that comprise no blockchain adoption and blockchain adoption to explore the impact of blockchain technology on the transparency of production processes. This study uses a Stackelberg game to model competition between the manufacturer and the retailer. We obtain the optimal wholesale and retail prices and corresponding profits for the manufacturer and retailer, respectively, in four scenarios. We show that the blockchain adoption in both centralized and decentralized supply chains increases the product greenness. Furthermore, the profit of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain with blockchain adoption is greater than without blockchain. We also analyze the sensitivity of consumers to product greenness and product price effects. If price is the main priority of consumers for purchasing, the use of blockchain technology will lead to a higher price and lower demand because, in this situation, demand will be more dependent on the product price compared to its greenness. We find that manufacturers' willingness to invest in the product's greenness level depends on consumers’ willingness to pay a premium.
Type of Study:
Research |
Subject:
Simulation & Stochastic Models Received: 2025/10/14 | Accepted: 2026/01/5