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Showing 2 results for soleimani

Rassoul Noorossana, Paria soleimani,
Volume 23, Issue 3 (IJIEPR 2012)

Abstract Profile monitoring in statistical quality control has attracted attention of many researchers recently. A profile is a function between response variables and one or more independent variables. There have been only a limited number of researches on monitoring multivariate profiles. Indeed, monitoring correlated multivariate profiles is a new subject in the fileld of statistical process control. In this paper, we investigate the effect of autocorrlation in monitoring multivariate linear profiles in phase II. The effect of three main models namely AR(1), MA(1), and ARMA(1,1) on the methods of multivariate linear profile monitoring is evaluated and compared by using simulation study and average run length criteria. Results indicate that autocorrelation affects performance of the existing methods significantly.
Ahmad Makui, Mojtaba soleimani Sedehi, Ehsan Bolandifar,
Volume 29, Issue 4 (IJIEPR 2018)

In today complex worldwide supply chains, intermediary organizations like Contract manufacturers and GPOs are mostly used. Well-known OEMs delegate their purchasing and procuring to these intermediaries. Because of their positive influence on supply chain efficiency, it is very important to investigate the role of intermediaries in today competitive supply chains. One important question arising about intermediaries is the conditions that the OEM controls his procurement or delegates this task to the intermediary organization?

To answer this question, this paper studies the equilibrium for component procurement strategies of two competing OEMs that produce substitutable products. Each OEM may either directly procure the input from the component supplier, or delegate the procurement task to the contract manufacturer. We analyze the OEMs’ procurement game under two contracting power schemes in such a supply chain: the supplier Stackelberg, where the component supplier acts as the Stackelberg leader, and the OEM Stackelberg, where the OEMs are the first movers.

We show that, the smaller OEM always prefers direct control of component procurement. This is because the OEM will receive a lower component price if the component supplier can price discriminate the OEMs. In contrast, the larger OEM’s preference depends on the contracting power scheme. Under the supplier Stackelberg, the larger OEM never prefers direct procurement; however, under the OEM Stackelberg, the larger OEM may have incentives to use direct procurement under reasonable conditions. This implies that a shift of the market power from the supplier to the OEMs may lead to more OEMs deviating from delegation to direct control.

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