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Showing 2 results for Game Model

L. Ma, P. Zhang,
Volume 12, Issue 4 (12-2014)

This paper aims to develop a quantitative game model for preventing construction project managers from moral hazard problem from the standpoint of construction enterprises in China. The authors analyze the sources of construction managers’ moral hazard behaviors under China’s specific situation on the basis of the principal-agent theory, establish a game theoretic model to analyze the moral hazard problem between construction enterprises and construction project managers, and calculate the equilibrium solution through building up the payoff matrix. Our crucial contribution is a quantitative characterization of risk deposit system and performance appraisal system which help to resolve the moral hazard problem of construction project managers. The solution results show that the probability of moral hazard problem of construction project managers can be reduced after implementing risk deposit system and performance appraisal system. Thus the two systems we proposed can be taken by China’s construction enterprises as the effective measures to resolve moral hazard problem of construction project managers.
Farnad Nasirzadeh, Hamed Mazandaranizadeh, Mehdi Rouhparvar,
Volume 14, Issue 3 (4-2016)

Risk allocation is the definition and division of responsibility associated with a possible future loss or gain arising from an identified risk. Quantitative approaches to risk allocation have been developed to overcome the limitations of qualitative approaches, especially the issue of the amount of risk to be borne by each party. This paper presents a cooperative-bargaining game model for quantitative risk allocation that extends the previous existing system dynamics SD-based model. The behavior of contracting parties in the quantitative risk allocation process is modeled as the players’ behavior in a game. The proposed model accounts for both the client costs and the contractor costs to perform the quantitative risk allocation process. To evaluate the performance of the proposed model, it has been employed in a pipeline project. Quantitative risk allocation is performed for the inflation as one of the most important identified risks. It is shown that using the proposed cooperative-bargaining game model, both the client and contractor costs are decreased in comparison to the previous SD-based risk allocation approach.

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